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Distinguishing Bundles from Sticks: Determining
Denominators in Regulatory Takings Cases Involving
Severed Mineral Rights
DENOMINATOR DELIRIUM: TREATMENT OF SEVERED MINERAL RIGHTS
BY LOWER COURTS
In 1992, a district court in Kansas held that a lessee of an oil and gas
interest who the state prohibited from drilling did not have a compensable
takings claim because a country club’s surface rights on the same tract of
land owned by a country club still had value.1 The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation” when the government takes
private property for public use; but courts are split over how to define the
relevant property, which affects the calculation for compensation in takings
cases.2 This difference of interpretation is as problematic for governments
opening themselves up to takings liability by passing regulations aimed at
bettering society as it is for property owners trying to anticipate the viability
of their potential takings claims against governments for those regulations.
Defining the property at issue accurately is critical to a regulatory taking
claim’s success or failure. Defining it narrowly enough will almost always
result in the finding of a taking, whereas defining it too broadly will mean
that a taking will almost never occur.3
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the first in a line of cases that
comprise the so-called regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court
held that regulations on exercising mineral rights could be so onerous that
they create compensable takings, in spite of valid governmental interests
for regulating mineral activity.4 Courts evaluate regulatory takings claims
using a conceptual fraction of the value lost by regulation, in which the
numerator is the loss in value of the affected property and the denominator
is the original value of the parcel against which courts weigh the loss in
value.5 If regulation strips all or almost all of the value from the relevant
Copyright 2019, by MICHAEL HEATON.
1. Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792 F. Supp. 1205, 1214 (D. Kan. 1992).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. U.S.,
568 U.S. 23 (2012). But see Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. U.S., 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); see Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Kan. 1992).
3. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1994).
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192
(1967).
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parcel, whatever a court determines that to be, the State owes the owner of
that parcel compensation.6 In other words, courts use the fraction of the
value lost by regulation to determine whether government action was so
burdensome as to require compensation under the Takings Clause.
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts should not
view separately owned mineral and surface rights—rights “severed” from
one another—together as one denominator.7 Viewing such separately held
rights as a single denominator would allow courts to consider all possible
surface uses in a takings analysis, despite the fact that an owner of
separately held mineral rights is only able to use the surface to the extent
necessary to explore and extract minerals.8 Under this single denominator
analysis, a district court in Kansas held that an owner of severed mineral
rights who the state had prohibited from drilling did not have a
compensable takings claim because surface rights on the same tract that
someone else owned still had value.9 This analysis, while consistent with
a doctrinal aversion to viewing the destruction of a single strand in the
proverbial “bundle of rights”10 that comprise ownership of property as a
compensable taking,11 is nonetheless troubling for owners of severed
mineral rights that would have no chance at receiving compensation for
burdensome regulations that still allow for alternative surface uses.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case establishing the current
predominant regulatory takings framework, cautioned against dividing
parcels into distinct property interests for the denominator analysis.12 The
Court has since upheld a merger of two adjacent tracts of land owned by
the same person, emphasizing the Court’s hostility toward dividing
potential denominators to increase takings liability.13 Despite the Court’s
hesitance to accept dividing parcels up for denominator analyses in those
cases, the Court should recognize severed mineral rights as separate
denominators. This conclusion is appropriate because, regardless of
whether a jurisdiction conceptualizes mineral interests in a rights-based
manner like Louisiana or an ownership-based manner like Texas, an owner
6. Id. at 1232-33.
7. Whitney Benefits, Inc., 926 F.2d, at 1172.
8. Id.
9. Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. at 1214.
10. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992). Property
is commonly described as “bundle of sticks” or rights that make up ownership,
with each interest in the property representing a single strand in the bundle. United
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 274 (2002).
11. Fee, supra note 3, at 1558.
12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
13. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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of separately held mineral rights cannot exercise all the uses of the
property that the owner of the surface rights can.14
Part I of this Comment provides background on the regulatory takings
doctrine and discusses the way courts tend to frame these issues. Part II of
this Comment juxtaposes ownership of mineral rights in Texas, a common
law jurisdiction, with ownership of such rights in Louisiana, a civilian
jurisdiction, and highlights the practical implications of these differing
approaches. Part III examines the history of the regulatory takings doctrine
and discusses the relevance and effects of the denominator analysis on
takings claims. Part IV focuses on the recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin
and its potential ramifications on denominator and regulatory takings
analyses. Reading this case broadly, the Court settled the question of
horizontal severance in the regulatory takings doctrine; but Murr may not
have as much doctrinal weight as some scholars believe. Part V
demonstrates the inapplicability of Murr’s acceptance of a merger of
adjacent lots united under common ownership to situations in which
different individuals own the mineral and surface rights in a single tract.
Part V also develops a more logical way to conceptualize the denominator
problem in these situations. In light of this analysis, courts should view
severed mineral rights as their own denominators.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
While courts have traditionally recognized takings when a
government actually seizes property, compensable takings can also arise
from situations in which regulation so burdens property that it effectively
seizes it.15 In other words, regulations can limit a property’s use so much
that courts deem states to have seized the property for the purposes of
compensability under the Takings Clause. This idea has evolved into a
complex doctrine of “regulatory takings.” Lower courts appear to have
difficulty consistently determining compensability of regulatory takings
of severed mineral rights,16 but a straightforward application of the
principles at the core of the doctrine suggests that such takings are indeed
compensable.

14. Annotation, Severance of title or rights to oil and gas in place from title
to surface, 146 A.L.R. 880 (2017).
15. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
16. See Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. at 1214; see also Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d
at 1172.
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A. The Traditional Bundle of Sticks
Scholars commonly describe property using the metaphor of a bundle
of sticks, with all the sticks representing individual rights; and it has
traditionally been the role of state law to determine which sticks compose
the bundle.17 If state property law sufficiently protects an economic
interest in property, courts may compel others to compensate owners if
they interfere with it.18 When a person owns a tract of land, she typically
also owns the rights to minerals that exist underground in her tract of
land.19 In these situations, the right to produce minerals is just one stick in
the traditional bundle of rights.20 This is not so with respect to separately
held mineral rights.
B. Dueling Perspectives on the Takings Clause
In spite of the Takings Clause’s broadly prohibitive language, there is
an interpretive split over how broadly to construe the clause. The Fifth
Amendment provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public
use, without just compensation.”21 When a government effectively seizes
private property for public use, it owes the former property-holder
compensation. Comporting with this traditional view of the Takings
Clause, Chief Justice Roberts once described the clause “as a barrier
between individuals and the press of the public interest.”22 While this
notion of the Takings Clause certainly finds support in the doctrine, other
interpretations abound.
Opinions as to the proper role of the Takings Clause in the protection
of private property widely vary. One approach uses a broad reading of the
Takings Clause, operating under the assumption that the Framers generally
opposed efforts to redistribute wealth.23 The Takings Clause, then, “states
a principle that the government pays for what it takes,” suggesting that
compensation under the Takings Clause is an inevitability, rather than the
17. Craft, 535 U.S. at 274.
18. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
19. See generally NANCY SAINT-PAUL, History of property interest in land—
Oil and gas, in 1A SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 8:10 (3d ed. 2017).
20. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 500–01 (1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
23. Benjamin Allee, Comment, Drawing the Line in Regulatory Takings
Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the
Denominator Problem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 1995 (2002).
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fact-intensive analysis of value lost that exists in most cases, particularly
in regulatory takings cases.24 However, scholars do not universally accept
the historical underpinnings of this philosophy.25 On the contrary, more
detailed accounts of the Constitution’s drafting reveal that the Framers
intended the Takings Clause to have a much narrower scope.26
Additionally, there are those who believe that the Fifth Amendment,
and by extension the Supreme Court of the United States, should not
protect property rights.27 Instead, those holding this view assert that this
task should fall to state courts and state legislatures, which should protect
these rights by defining them clearly.28 The Court’s role, then, “is to figure
out some means whereby the broad and capacious terms of the clause are
narrowed, so as to remove the constraint that it imposes on the actions of
federal and state governments.”29 While judges and justices seldom accept
this narrower view of the Takings Clause in traditional takings cases, they
tend to do so with respect to regulatory takings cases.
C. Regulatory Takings as an Outgrowth of the Narrower View
The Court construes the Takings Clause as having a narrower reach
with respect to regulatory takings than it does for traditional takings cases,
in the sense that fewer cases result in compensability.30 Originalists, like
Justice Thomas, explain this difference in approach by arguing that
regulatory takings were never intended to fall within the ambit of
compensability under the Takings Clause.31 Although Justice Thomas’
view is extreme, as it implies the erroneousness of an entire doctrine, it
underscores a hostility toward compensating property owners for smallerscale takings that pervades regulatory takings jurisprudence.32
24. Fee, supra note 3, at 1553.
25. Allee, supra note 23, at 1995.
26. Id.
27. Rick Hills, A Half-Hearted Two Cheers for the Victory of Federalism
over Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin (June 23, 2017), PRAWFSBLAWG,
https://perma.cc/DN7Y-RUFB.
28. Id.
29. Richard A. Epstein, Will the Supreme Court Clean Up Takings Law in
Murr v. Wisconsin?, 11.1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 860, 862 (2017).
30. See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014).
31. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. See Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)); see also Penn Cent.
Transp. 438 U.S. 104.
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A stark difference in the protection of property affected by burdensome
regulation, as opposed to property seized in a more conventional way, is the
rationale set forth in the “Armstrong principle.” This principle states that the
Takings Clause in the regulatory takings context is meant “to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”33 The
Supreme Court’s emphasis on “fairness and justice” and “public burdens”
seems more emblematic of substantive due process analyses than traditional
takings analyses.34 Reading this sort of balancing of interests into the takings
analysis complicates what is an otherwise straightforward question of
whether some governmental action reached the level of a seizure of private
property.
The owner-centric, fairness-focused language of the Armstrong
principle, on its face, seems incompatible with the property-focused,
broadly prohibitive language of the Takings Clause.35 The fact that fairness
enters the calculus at all might favor a narrower view of the Takings Clause
in the regulatory takings context, since it precludes compensability where
the fairness rationale would not apply. In spite of this potential narrowing
effect, the Armstrong principle militates in favor of compensating owners of
separately held mineral rights because it would be unfair to force owners of
such rights to lose a higher proportion of the value of their property than
owners of mineral rights and surface rights without compensation.
Some scholars urge the Court to eliminate the division between
physical and regulatory takings altogether, replacing this formalistic
distinction with a rule that requires the government to compensate private
owners for all losses—no matter their magnitude or the property rights
with which they are associated—any time the government does not have
traditional police power justifications for regulation.36 While a bright-line
rule like this would certainly make the regulatory takings analysis less
complicated and easier to predict, the likelihood of the Court adopting this
sort of rule is very slim, especially in light of the current state of the
doctrine, since adopting it would require a much broader view of the
Takings Clause. This sort of bright-line rule would also expose the
government to crippling financial liability any time it did something that
interfered with property interests.
While the Court has not adopted the preceding bright-line rule, it has
adopted some bright-line rules that simplify regulatory takings analyses in
33.
34.
35.
36.

Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
Eagle, supra note 30, at 614.
Id.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 29, at 875.
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some cases. One such rule is the Lucas “per se takings” test, which stands
for the proposition that the State owes compensation any time it deprives
property of all economically viable use, unless the State had prohibited the
use at the time the owner acquired title.37 If property owners do not satisfy
the requirements of the per se rule, they are at the mercy of courts weighing
and balancing various factors, including those set forth in Penn Central v.
City of New York and, as of June 2017, Murr v. Wisconsin.38
Penn Central requires inquiry into the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action to determine whether a compensable taking occurred.39
Murr v. Wisconsin states that the denominator analysis depends on: the
treatment of the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics
of the land, the prospective value of the regulated land, and background
customs and the whole of our legal tradition.40 Whether under Lucas or Penn
Central, though, the denominator problem still exists because applying the
denominator analysis to determine the property at issue necessarily precedes
using the takings analysis to determine how the challenged regulation
impacted that property.
D. Distinguishing Bundles from Sticks
In determining whether the State owes compensation, the Court has
calculated the value lost by regulation using a conceptual fraction in which
the numerator is the loss in value of the affected property.41 The preregulation value of the parcel against which courts will weigh the loss in
value is the “denominator” in a regulatory takings case.42 If the proportion
of the value destroyed as compared to the relevant denominator is all or
nearly all, the State owes compensation.43 This means that the government
will owe compensation when its regulations strip a property of all or nearly
all of its value.
For the purposes of the Takings Clause, courts sometimes treat
intangible property rights, like mineral rights, as property and sometimes

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
Michelman, supra note 5, at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1232–33.
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do not, which makes it difficult to predict outcomes in particular cases.44
This lack of clarity in the jurisprudence makes it challenging for property
owners to discern denominators on their own. Determining the
denominator in the context of a regulatory takings case is especially
difficult because the Court has repeatedly held that the takings analysis
must use the “parcel as a whole” as the denominator without clearly
articulating what comprises that parcel.45 For instance, it is unclear
whether separately held mineral rights should constitute merely one stick
in the traditional bundle, thus making the denominator both the mineral
rights and the surface rights owned by someone else.
Courts might just as easily construe separately held mineral rights as
bundles, and thus denominators, unto themselves. In fact, treating
separately held mineral rights as denominators apart from the surface
rights owned by someone else makes sense in light of the separately held
nature of these rights.46 Conceptualizing the denominator accurately is
critical to the success or failure of a takings claim because defining it
narrowly enough will almost always result in the finding of a taking,
whereas defining it too broadly will mean that a regulatory taking will
almost never occur.47
For example, if surface rights are a part of the denominator in a case
involving separately held mineral rights, such a takings claim will be
significantly less likely to succeed because the court would consider
alternative surface uses that have value although the owner of separately
held mineral rights could not exercise any of these uses. Using this analysis
to preclude compensability of regulatory takings claims by owners of
separately held mineral rights violates the Armstrong principle and seems
at odds with the core principles of the regulatory takings doctrine. Thus,
the appropriate denominator in regulatory takings cases involving
separately held minerals rights is those rights themselves, and not those
rights in combination with separately held surface rights.

44. Andrew Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory
Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 578 (2003).
45. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
46. To be clear, the author is not discounting the policy reasons that favor
striking down a claim of a regulatory taking of severed mineral rights on the
merits. See generally Kevin J. Lynch, Regulation of Fracking is Not a Taking of
Private Property, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 39 (2016). The author is merely arguing, as
a threshold matter, that the proper denominator in such a case is the severed
mineral rights, not these rights and the surface rights.
47. Fee, supra note 3, at 1536.
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II. UNDERSTANDING MINERAL RIGHTS
Determining whether separately held mineral rights constitute all or
merely part of the denominator in a regulatory takings action requires
examination of the essence of these rights. The nature of mineral rights in
Louisiana, a civilian jurisdiction, is different from the nature of these rights
in Texas, a common law jurisdiction; and these differing approaches could
impact regulatory takings analyses. While all states have developed their
own bodies of mineral law, Louisiana’s and Texas’ disparate treatments
of mineral rights are noteworthy, not only because they highlight the
distinction between civilian and common law treatment of these rights but
also because of these states’ reputations for being rich in minerals.48
A. Louisiana’s Treatment of Mineral Rights
In the absence of controlling provisions in the Civil Code or special
legislation, Louisiana courts created rules for mineral rights by
analogizing to disparate provisions in the Civil Code.49 In 1920, in FrostJohnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs et al., the Louisiana Supreme Court
began to clarify the nature of mineral rights in Louisiana by explicitly
rejecting “dismemberment of the so-called mineral estate from the socalled surface estate.”50 This view of separate estates remains the common
law rule today, but this common law notion of estates has never been part
of Louisiana law.51 Instead, Louisiana has used a more rights-based
conception of mineral rights.
In 1974, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Mineral Code as a
supplement to the Civil Code in order to clarify the state’s mineral law.52
The legislature has seldom amended the Mineral Code.53 Under the
Louisiana Mineral Code, ownership of land does not necessarily include
ownership of oil, gas, and other liquid or gaseous minerals.54 The
48. See Paul Ausick & Michael B. Sauter, The 10 most oil-rich states, USA
TODAY (Aug. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/LZ87-28Q9.
49. Patrick S. Ottinger, From the Courts to the Code: The Origin and
Development of the Law of Louisiana on Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. &
RESOURCES 5, 16 (2012).
50. Id. at 24; See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs et al., 91 So.
207 (1920).
51. Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana Texas Oil & Gas Law:
An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 782–83 (1992).
52. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1 et seq. (2017).
53. Ottinger, supra note 49, at 40.
54. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2017).
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landowner does, however, have the exclusive right to explore and develop
her property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to
possession and ownership.55 Therefore, in spite of the fact that a Louisiana
mineral rights holder does not “own” the minerals in her property in place,
she nevertheless has comparable rights to the minerals as someone in an
ownership-based jurisdiction, like Texas. In contrast to the common law
notion of “estates,” under Louisiana’s Civil Code, everything is subject to
absolute ownership; and things like mineral rights are burdens or charges
on absolute ownership.56 Louisiana defines mineral rights as incorporeal
immovables that are alienable and heritable.57
B. Texas’ Treatment of Mineral Rights
Texas, for the most part, follows the traditional common law theory of
mineral and surface estates that are conceptually distinct from one another
and thus severable.58 In Texas, mineral estate holders have executive and
leasing rights, the right to explore and develop, and the right to receive
royalties and other payments.59 The ownership-in-place doctrine,
predominant in Texas, asserts that the holder of a mineral right owns the oil
and gas in the ground even though no one actually possesses it until they
bring it to the surface.60 Through this doctrine, Texas courts have come up
with one way to facilitate severance of mineral estates from surface estates
and have encouraged exploitation of underground reservoirs of oil, gas, and
groundwater.61
Vertically severing62 mineral estates from surface estates creates
problems for owners of severed mineral estates, particularly when they
55. Id.
56. Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 784.
57. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:18 (2017). “Alienable and heritable” here means that
the mineral rights may be conceptually separated from the land and sold or
inherited as something apart from the land itself. See Hornsby v. Slade, 854 So.
2d 441, 445–46 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
58. See Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas
Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings
Challenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349 (2007).
59. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (1986).
60. Dayna Ferebee, Comment, Handshakes and Heartaches: Who Owns the
Oil After Rogers v. Ricane?, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 129, 138 (1995).
61. Riley, supra note 58, at 358.
62. As will be addressed in greater detail in Part V, while the Court is
generally unfriendly to any form of so-called conceptual severance, it is possible
to sever property for takings analyses vertically—into mineral, surface, and air
rights—or horizontally along lot lines. See Darren Botello-Samson, The
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want to access or use the surface. Often, the owners of the mineral estate
have no ownership rights in the surface estate.63 Texas resolves this issue
by recognizing an implied easement to conduct mineral activity and by
clearly defining responsibilities between severed surface and mineral
estate owners.64 Without such an implied easement, owners of severed
mineral estates would be in the awkward position of having no means of
exercising the rights to the minerals in the ground they purchased.
These rules and others like them “are predicated on a fundamental
truism in Texas: the mineral estate is dominant over the surface.”65 This
means that the mineral estate owner can exercise her rights over the
objection of the surface estate owner, allowing her to do whatever is
reasonably necessary to exercise those rights.66 Of course, while the mineral
estate owner does have access to the surface to facilitate production, the law
recognizes that this surface access is not completely unlimited.67
C. Comparing the Louisiana and Texas Approaches
Some scholars suggest the Mineral Code owes at least some credit to
Texas cases for many of its provisions, referencing comments to the Mineral
Code articles that borrow standards from Texas precedent.68 For example,
as mentioned briefly above, Louisiana mineral rights are alienable and
heritable, meaning previous owners can transfer them to new owners, in
much the same way owners can transfer a severed mineral estate under
Texas law.69
In Louisiana, when a landowner sells off the ability to produce minerals
on her land, she is granting a mineral servitude, which is a “right of
enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and
producing minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”70 This
is one of the above-mentioned burdens or charges on absolute ownership
that Louisiana recognizes.71 While Texas landowners own the minerals
Benchmark of Expectations: Regulatory Takings and Surface Coal Mining, 22
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2008).
63. Riley, supra note 58, at 358.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners—What Happens
When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D. L. REV. 41, 68 (1987).
68. Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 779.
69. See Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445-46; see LA. REV. STAT. § 31:18 (2017).
70. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2017).
71. See Martin & Yeates, supra note 51, at 784.
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themselves through the ownership-in-place theory, Louisiana landowners
have the “right to produce” the minerals on their property.72 In Louisiana,
landowners cannot create and sell a separate estate for the minerals on their
property, but they can sell off their right to produce those minerals.73
D. A Distinction without a Difference?
Under Texas’ ownership-in-place theory, under which the landowner
owns the “fee” to oil, landowners can sever oil and gas in place from the
surface.74 Nevertheless, courts can reach similar results under rights-based
theories like Louisiana’s where owners can grant rights to all the production
of oil from a property to someone other than the owner of the surface.75
Under both theories, the practical effect is the same: landowners can transfer
all of the mineral rights usually belonging to them to someone else.76 There
are certainly conceptual differences between civil and common law
treatment of mineral rights, and there are plenty of differences in treatment
of minerals from state to state. No matter what theory of ownership a state
has or how a particular state conceptualizes mineral rights, the holder of
those rights does not also have access to all potential surface uses. Thus, the
denominator calculation, and, by relation, the regulatory takings analysis,
should remain the same.77
III.

TREATMENT OF REGULATORY TAKINGS: ANALYSIS UNDER A
SHIFTING DOCTRINE
The regulatory takings doctrine is still relatively young, as it only
began to develop around 1922.78 The current factor-based analysis of
regulatory takings did not develop until 1978.79 As will become clear,
however, this test is not the beginning and end of every regulatory takings
analysis, as it has numerous exceptions and modifications that apply to
72. Id. at 803.
73. Id. at 804.
74. Annotation, Severance of title or rights to oil and gas in place from title
to surface, 146 A.L.R. 880 (2017).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1172. If, however, a state treated mineral
rights as completely non-severable from surface rights, courts would have no
choice but to conclude that mineral rights and surface rights should be viewed
together as a single denominator.
78. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
79. See Penn. Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. 104.
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specific circumstances. The Court’s latest gloss on the denominator
analysis that precedes an analysis of compensability of regulatory takings
came in the summer of 2017.80
A. The Doctrine in its Infancy
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a statute which prohibited miners from extracting sub-surface
coal that supported surface-level buildings owned by someone else by
classifying it as a regulatory taking. The Court explained that it did not
“see that the fact that [such surface owners’] risk has become a danger
warrants giving to them greater rights than they bought.”81 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the coal company that filed the takings claim only had
rights to the minerals, not to the surface, because they sold the surface
before the statute’s enactment.82 This was the first case to afford protection
under the Takings Clause to owners of severed mineral rights, and many
legal scholars see Justice Holmes’ opinion in this case as the beginning of
the regulatory takings doctrine.83
Justice Brandeis’ lone dissent in Pennsylvania Coal demonstrates that,
from the inception of regulatory takings jurisprudence, there was
disagreement about how best to determine the relevant parcel in cases
concerning separately held mineral rights.84 Justice Holmes appeared to
address only the value of the affected coal.85 Justice Brandeis, on the other
hand, argued that the Court should consider the value of the “whole
property” because the sum of the rights in parts of property, surface and
subsoil, cannot be greater than the rights associated with the whole.86

80. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933.
81. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
82. Id. at 412.
83. See, e.g., Daniel R. Hansen, Environmental Regulation and Just
Compensation: The National Priorities List as a Taking, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
5 (1993).
84. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
85. Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take: The Evolution and Meaning of the
Supreme Court’s Three Regulatory Takings Standards, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 243, 263
(1998).
86. Id. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brandeis’ ad coelum87 conception of property, which would
consider the surface as well as the subsurface in the takings analysis,88
makes sense when the owner of the mineral rights also owns the surface
rights. However, this treatment of property makes no sense in the context
of separately held mineral rights because it increases the parcel considered
as the denominator, thus reducing the likelihood of compensability, by
considering uses outside the control of the owner of the mineral rights.89
Justice Holmes’ notion of the denominator as only the mineral rights in
regulatory takings cases concerning separately held mineral rights is more
logical than an alternative theory that would reduce the likelihood of
takings by considering uses of the surface outside the control of the owner
of the mineral rights.
B. Penn Central and its Impact
The next watershed for the regulatory takings doctrine was the
development of the factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.90 New York City adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law
(LPL) in 1965 to protect and enhance its landmarks and historic districts.91
Final designation as a landmark under this law resulted in land use
restrictions.92 The City designated Penn Central Terminal as a landmark
under the LPL and designated the city tax block as a landmark site.93 Penn
Central entered into a contract with UGP Properties for UGP to build a
multistory office building on top of the terminal, but the Commission
rejected certificates for this proposed development.94 None of Penn
Central’s attempts to secure judicial relief in New York state courts were
successful, so it appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.95
87. The ad coelum doctrine is the “common-law rule that a landowner holds
everything above and below the land, up to the sky and down to the earth’s core,
including all minerals.” Ad coelum doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
88. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
89. This is leaving aside the merits of Brandeis’ argument if the same person
owns both mineral and surface rights, in which case a burden on the former would
leave the latter completely unaffected. In this situation, the ad coelum view, and
its effect of decreasing the likelihood of compensability, makes sense.
90. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104.
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id. at 115–16.
94. Id. at 116–17.
95. Id. at 119–22.
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The Court established the current regulatory takings analysis96 by
identifying the following factors for determining such takings from
jurisprudence at the time: the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action.97 The application of this factor test and the way that courts have
weighed each factor has varied greatly. Legal scholar Steven J. Eagle98
believes that the Penn Central inquiry also implicitly included a fourth
factor, the “parcel as a whole,” which was another concept discussed in the
opinion.99 The “parcel as a whole” is essentially shorthand for the
denominator in these cases; so Eagle, by identifying this as a fourth factor,
acknowledges that the denominator analysis and the takings compensability
analysis are intertwined. Because these analyses are related, how courts
determine the denominator in a case involving separately held mineral rights
is critical to whether such a claim will be compensable.
C. After Penn Central: Bright-Line Bonanza
As mentioned above, courts have varied in their applications and
balancing of the Penn Central factors. As Eagle points out, since Penn
Central, courts have “patched its flaws with [other] increasingly complex
tests.”100 The Court has issued a number of decisions interpreting the scope
of the Takings Clause that have provided sparse guidance by supplying
some categorical rules; but these decisions have also muddied the doctrine
with additional considerations.
While Penn Central is the primary test for the compensability of
regulatory takings, other factors and cases continue to influence the
doctrine.101 In fact, the Court sometimes evades the Penn Central analysis
altogether by relying on one of the bright-line rules the court has

96. One legal scholar said, “Penn Central now stands as the central test used
to determine the existence of a regulatory taking.” Botello-Samson, supra note
62, at 7.
97. Penn Cent.Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
98. Steven J. Eagle is a professor of law at George Mason University’s
School of Law and has written extensively on regulatory takings issues, including
a comprehensive treatise on the topic available through Lexis. HOME PAGE OF
STEVEN J. EAGLE, PROFESSOR OF LAW, https://perma.cc/3C8F-9MLA (last visited
September 20, 2017).
99. Eagle, supra note 30, at 614; See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
100. Eagle, supra note 30, at 603.
101. Botello-Samson, supra note 62, at 8.
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developed to supplement the Penn Central analysis.102 Since critics have
attacked the Penn Central test as vague, the Court might be relying on
additional rules to bolster the regulatory takings doctrine with some brightline rules. By developing exceptions to the Penn Central framework, the
doctrine may appear more predictable; but the limited scope of these
bright-line rules necessarily means they cannot clarify the entire doctrine.
The exceptions and additions to the Penn Central analysis are myriad,
which also allows courts to be inconsistent in their application of these
additional considerations.103
One such exception to the Penn Central analysis came from Lucas, in
which the Court held that, if the loss of property use resulting from a
regulation is equal to the sum of all usage rights in a piece of property, a
compensable taking has occurred.104 Lucas does come with a significant
caveat: the government may deny compensation if “the proscribed use
interests were not a part of [the owner’s] title to begin with.”105 In some
cases, this means that if regulations were in place at the time the owner
acquired the property, the owner has no means of challenging them as
takings because the uses fall outside the reasonable investment-backed
expectations prong of Penn Central.106 The Court itself pointed out in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island that this principle of denying takings where the
owner was on notice of the regulation at the time of purchase should not
be taken too far. In that case, the Court warned that states should not be
allowed to “put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” by passing
legislation that would progressively restrict uses after subsequent changes
in ownership.107
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, which
challenged a Pennsylvania statute limiting coal mining at such a level as
to undermine support of surface-level properties, the Court expressed
“hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of property
that are tantamount to public nuisances.”108 The Court upheld the statute
102. Id. at 9-10.
103. Id.
104. Fee, supra note 3, at 1536; see Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
105. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
106. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
107. 533 U.S. at 627 (2001). Of course, where a landowner attempts to
increase takings liability by severing her property into smaller pieces that will
experience intensified economic impacts under regulatory burdens, compensation
is not owed. Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a
Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis,
34 ENVTL. L. 175, 229 (2004).
108. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
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in Keystone while nevertheless declining to invalidate the earlier
Pennsylvania Coal decision that struck down a similar statute.109 In so
doing, the Court relied on an established “public nuisance exception” to
the compensability of takings, which generally states that the state has
power to regulate private property for health and general welfare purposes
even where the regulation deprives the property of all its value.110
The Court distinguished Keystone from the earlier case, positing that
Keystone dealt with public interests, whereas, in Pennsylvania Coal, the
Kohler Act served only private interests because it was more tailored to a
specific situation.111 The Court explained that the Kohler Act was meant
for the sole protection of surface owners who had released their rights to
the subsurface, whereas the legislation at issue in Keystone more generally
protected society from unsafe mining practices.112 The takeaway from
Keystone is that statutes that merely prohibit mining at levels that will
likely lead to subsidence or other dangers to surface owners will likely not
lead to compensable takings. The Court reached this conclusion without
clearly describing the proper denominator for cases involving separately
held mineral rights, finding that the statute fell within the categorical
“public nuisance” exception.113 The various bright-line exceptions to Penn
Central and to the general principle of compensability of regulatory
takings produce mixed results for owners of separately held mineral rights.
In an ownership-in-place jurisdiction like Texas or a rights-based
jurisdiction like Louisiana, regulation of mineral rights can lead to
compensable takings under Penn Central or possibly even under Lucas,
because both jurisdictions recognize the possibility of separately held
mineral rights. Under both theories of ownership, though, if state property
law changes to outlaw this possibility, regulation of mineral rights would
be less likely to lead to compensable takings under Penn Central and
would almost certainly not lead to compensable takings under Lucas.
Additionally, if the purpose of regulation is to protect the public from an
unacceptable risk of harm, the regulation would fit squarely in the public
nuisance exception to compensability articulated in Keystone and thus not
lead to a compensable taking.
109. Id.
110. Miller, supra note 85, at 254.
111. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484.
112. Id. at 482.
113. The Court explained, “. . . even if we were to accept petitioners’ invitation
to view the support estate as a distinct segment of property for ‘takings’ purposes,
they have not satisfied their heavy burden of sustaining a facial challenge to the
Act,” signaling that it was not basing its decision on the denominator
determination. Id. at 501.
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IV. MURR V. WISCONSIN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In the summer of 2017, the Court published its opinion in Murr v.
Wisconsin, its latest interpretation of the regulatory takings doctrine. 114
Murr does not replace Penn Central but is rather another example of the
aforementioned factor tests designed to fill gaps in the Penn Central
factors.115 In particular, it is designed to address and better articulate what
constitutes the denominator in a case involving adjacent lots owned by the
same person.116 Before this case, most courts entertained “at least a strong
presumption” that contiguous land united under common ownership
should comprise a single parcel for a takings analysis.117 This presumption
is now much closer to black-letter law because of the Court’s decision in
Murr.
A. The Facts of Murr
The Murrs purchased a small lot in 1960 and built a small cabin on
it.118 In 1961, they transferred the lot to the family plumbing company.119
In 1963, they purchased the neighboring lot in their own names.120 The
Murrs later transferred the lots, one at a time in 1994 and 1995, to their
children.121 At this time, a county ordinance, which prohibited the
individual development or sale of adjacent lots united under common
ownership unless they made up at least an acre measured together or
separately, merged the lots.122 The Murrs asked for variances from the St.
Croix County Board of Adjustment to allow them to move the cabin to a
different portion of the lot it was on and sell the other lot to fund this move;
and the Board denied their requests.123 The Murrs then brought suit
challenging the merger ordinance as a regulatory taking.124

114. Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933.
115. See Eagle, supra note 30, at 603.
116. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
117. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1003, 1031 (2003).
118. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1941.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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B. The Majority’s Analysis: New Factors for the Denominator
Determination
The Court tweaked the regulatory takings analysis by identifying
factors to “determine whether reasonable expectations about property
ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would
be treated as one parcel or as separate tracts.”125 These factors determine
the proper denominator in regulatory takings cases dealing with multiple
adjacent tracts of land. Murr sets forth the following factors: the treatment
of the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the
land, the prospective value of the regulated land, and background customs
and the whole of our legal tradition.126
These factors make sense in the context of the facts in Murr but will be
difficult to apply to cases that deviate from these particular facts.
Additionally, if reasonable expectations actually do guide the factors, and
thus the denominator analysis, separately held mineral rights should
certainly constitute denominators apart from the surface rights. Considering
reasonable expectations, it is unlikely that owners of severed mineral rights
would reasonably expect such rights to be viewed in conjunction with
surface rights over which they have no legal authority.
C. Criticism of the New Factors from the Bench
The Justices on the Court were not all on board with the majority’s
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts penned a dissent in Murr that Justices
Thomas and Alito joined.127 Justice Roberts argued that the majority’s
departure from previously settled deference to state property rules
“authorize[d] governments to do precisely what [the Court] rejected in Penn
Central: create a litigation-specific definition of ‘property’ designed for a
claim under the Takings Clause.”128 He went on to say that such a departure
from deference to state law property regimes “compromises the Takings
Clause as a barrier between individuals and the press of the public
interest.”129 This retreat from using state law definitions of property to
determine denominators is worrisome for private landowners across the
United States, as it creates the possibility of fewer compensable takings, but
should perhaps be less so to individuals who own only the rights to minerals.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1938.
Id. at 1945.
Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1954–55 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas filed his own dissent in Murr, in which he
recommended that the Court should reexamine its regulatory takings
jurisprudence, “to see whether it can be grounded in the original public
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”130 Justice Thomas
suggested that Pennsylvania Coal and its progeny, and thus the entire
regulatory takings doctrine, were out of step with the understanding at the
time that the Takings Clause only provided compensation in cases of direct
appropriation of property.131 This narrow scope of the Takings Clause would
lead to substantially fewer compensable takings and would turn years of
doctrine on its head.
While even Justice Thomas would likely agree that the Court
invalidating an entire doctrine seems unrealistic, the dissents in Murr
demonstrate that there is still some hesitance by members of the Court to
move away from deference to state definitions of property interests. Justice
Roberts points out that the conclusion in any given case might be the same
but nevertheless argues that courts should not look to factors outside of state
law to define the boundaries of parcels of land.132 State definitions of
property interests should determine denominators, and courts should only
use other factors to determine whether a compensable taking actually
occurred.
D. Frontloading the Merits Analysis: The Impact of Murr
After the decision in Murr, there was a flurry of legal scholarship
attempting to unpack its significance and potential impact on the regulatory
takings doctrine. For some legal scholars, a case like Murr means relatively
little because they believe that state governments, not the Fifth Amendment,
should protect private property.133 Others believe the most effective strategy

130. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
133. Rick Hills, A Half-Hearted Two Cheers for the Victory of Federalism over
Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin (June 23, 2017), PRAWFSBLAWG,
https://perma.cc/SQ8U-SUL2. The Wisconsin legislature seemed to vindicate this
approach by enacting a “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” in direct response to the
Supreme Court’s ruling, but a legislative fix does not change the fact that this sort of
merger has been upheld as a matter of federal constitutional law. See E-Update, State
Representative Robert Brooks (November 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/6YEE-R5S7.

2019]

COMMENT

573

of protecting property rights “combines litigation with political action,
rather than relying on either exclusively.”134
The inherent flexibility of the regulatory takings doctrine made it
somewhat difficult to determine denominators before Murr.135 The Court’s
creation of additional factors certainly did not make the denominator
analysis any easier.136 The majority’s approach also opens the door to
strategic manipulation by landowners who will try to lessen their risk of
uncompensated takings by avoiding placing contiguous lots under
common ownership, and by the state, which will likewise attempt to
manipulate the factors in the majority opinion to its own advantage.137
Murr might also make landowners prove a taking twice by doublecounting factors associated with a loss in value of the property, once to
determine the appropriate denominator and again to determine whether a
compensable taking occurred.138 This puts the question backward by
emphasizing loss in value before determining the proper denominator.139
The front-loading of any valuations certainly gives the impression that the
Court is setting the bar much higher for plaintiffs trying to prove
regulatory takings than for plaintiffs claiming traditional takings. On the
other hand, this may just be yet another outgrowth of the Court’s attempts
to constrain compensability of regulatory takings.
Some argue that Murr gives “undue attention to the needs of the
government without giving due consideration to the notion of ‘property’ or
the rights that inure to the ‘owner’ of property in the first instance.”140 As
evidenced by the Court’s broad application of the so-called “public nuisance
exception” to the compensability of takings in Keystone,141 the scales
undoubtedly tip in the government’s favor when considering the
compensability of a regulatory taking associated with potentially dangerous
134. Ilya Somin, More on Murr – a response to Rick Hills, WASHINGTON POST,
June 23, 2017, https://perma.cc/97WD-GRYZ.
135. Michael M. Berger, Murr: More Confusion and More Work for Lawyers,
The U.S. Supreme Court and Property Rights: The “Larger Parcel” Issue and the
Future of Regulatory Takings, TSZF02 ALI-CLE 75 (July 25, 2017).
136. Ilya Somin, A Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin [updated
with a link to my response to Prof. Rick Hills], WASHINGTON POST, June 23, 2017,
https://perma.cc/32X4-7P7U.
137. Id.
138. Robert H. Thomas, Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What Happened
to Use in Murr v. Wisconsin?, TSFZ02 ALI-CLE 129 (July 25, 2017).
139. Berger, supra note 135.
140. Karl E. Geier, No Boundaries: The Erosion of Private Property Rights by
Judicial Deference to Regulatory Overreach, 28 MILLER & STARR REAL EST.
NEWSALERT, no. 1, Sept. 2017, at 3.
141. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
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activities like producing minerals. At least one scholar has expressed
concern that Murr might create an “exception for cases where the owner
happens to own a lot next door.”142 Respectfully, while Murr is certainly
troubling for owners of contiguous lots, factor tests like the one created in
Murr do not create such categorical rules. Factual differences might lead to
more landowner-friendly results in future cases. The reach of Murr is
limited in that the factors favor different results in situations other than the
specific facts of the case, such as cases involving separately held mineral
rights.
V. APPLICATION OF MURR TO SEPARATELY HELD MINERAL RIGHTS AND
A PATH FORWARD FOR THE DOCTRINE
Application of the factor test set forth in Murr favors treating
separately held mineral rights as a distinct denominator. Under the factors
identified as relevant by the Court, mineral rights owned by someone other
than the owner of the surface rights should be viewed as an independent
parcel for the purposes of the regulatory takings analysis.
A. The Murr Factors’ Application to Separately Held Mineral Rights
If “reasonable expectations about property ownership”143 are what
shape the majority’s factors in Murr, and thus the whole denominator
analysis, the case for separately held mineral rights comprising a
denominator apart from the surface rights is even stronger. It would be
unreasonable for an owner of severed mineral rights to expect a court to
define her property in conjunction with surface rights to which she has no
legal claim for a takings analysis, especially in light of the ways states
have created systems which favor, or at least promote, separate ownership
of mineral rights.144
The first factor the Murr Court considers is the treatment of the parcels
under state and local law.145 As highlighted in an earlier section of this
Comment,146 whether using a rights-based or ownership-based theory of
mineral rights, these rights are conceptually distinct from the underlying
land because it is possible to sell one’s mineral rights without also selling
other uses of the tract of land.147 Since these rights are susceptible of
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Somin, supra note 136.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
See supra Part II.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
See supra Part II(D).
See supra Part II.
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separate ownership, and since states have gone to such great lengths to
facilitate mineral production, it follows logically that mineral rights should
constitute their own denominators and be compensable as separate parcels
when they are owned by someone other than the landowner.
The Court has expressed that, while states can pass reasonable land
use regulations without effecting takings, states may not use regulation as
an end-run around the Fifth Amendment by stripping more and more uses
from property owners’ titles over time.148 Treating separately held mineral
rights as part of a larger denominator includes uses to which the mineral
rights-holder has no access in the consideration of what value is lost. This
facilitates an erosion of the Takings Clause by allowing states to constantly
fall back on the argument that there are other uses associated with the
property, even if the holder of the mineral rights cannot exercise them.
Especially in states like Texas, where mineral rights explicitly dominate
over surface rights,149 courts should recognize such state efforts to protect
the rights of mineral owners as militating in favor of viewing separately
held mineral rights as separate denominators.
The second factor the Murr Court considers is the physical
characteristics of the tracts, which include things like the physical
relationship of distinguishable tracts, the topography, and the surrounding
environment.150 The Court’s gloss on this factor in particular suggests that
the Court is not trying to create a factor test with broad applicability across
a range of potential denominator determinations. Some denominator
analyses will necessarily require courts to make distinctions between
theories of ownership rather than the physical composition of the property
at issue. Applied in Murr by considering the range of the tracts’ alternative
uses, this factor favors viewing separately held mineral rights as separate
denominators because owners’ rights in these situations are so limited.
The third factor the Murr Court considers is the prospective value,
which is calculated under the challenged regulation with special attention
to the effect of the burdened land on the value of the other holdings.151 In
applying this factor, the Court compared the value of the Murrs’ lots
separately to the value of the lots together and arrived at the conclusion
that, since the lots were worth significantly more valued together, they
could also be viewed together for denominator purposes.152 The value of
mineral rights together with surface rights would not likely be significantly
higher than the respective values of these rights separately, so this factor
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
See Riley, supra note 58, at 358.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
Id. at 1948–49.
Id. at 1949.
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also seems to favor viewing separately held mineral rights as a separate
denominator.
As articulated earlier in this Comment, collapsing considerations of
value into the denominator analysis creates conceptual problems and may
lead to double-counting of some of the factors traditionally associated with
the question of whether there is a compensable taking in a particular
case.153 The Court’s evolution of a complex, multi-faceted regulatory
takings analysis has frustrated and confused lower courts, and even the
Court itself has been inconsistent with its application of all the parts and
sub-parts of the analysis it created.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that, whatever its merit, the Murr
formulation does not settle all questions of conceptual severance, taking one
stick from the proverbial bundle and treating it separately for the purposes
of a takings analysis, in denominator problems.154 Instead, the factor test
seems to only provide an answer to the horizontal severance issue—that is,
creating multiple denominators by splitting distinguishable parcels up along
lot lines—because this is the only situation for which the Court was
examining “reasonable expectations about property ownership.”155 As
demonstrated below, it is not even completely clear that Murr provides a
firm answer on the question of whether this sort of conceptual severance is
acceptable.
B. What the Murr Analysis Leaves Unsettled
Many courts have failed to explicitly articulate their reasoning in
particular regulatory takings cases, choosing instead to express
conclusions without much indication of how they reached these results.156
These leaps in logic make regulatory determinations seem arbitrary and
unpredictable.157 Compounding this problem is the fact that the Court
allows multiple analyses for similar issues to co-exist, further muddying
an already murky doctrine. For example, one Federal Circuit case,158
which came up through the courts at the same time as Murr, suggests that
Murr did not completely settle the horizontal severance issue.159 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the proper denominator in a case involving
153. See supra Part IV.
154. See Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem,
27 RUTGERS L. J. 663, 694 (1996).
155. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
156. Fee, supra note 3, at 1537.
157. Id.
158. Lost Tree Village Corp. v. U.S., 787 F.3d 1111 (2015).
159. Thomas, supra note 138.
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the Corps of Engineers’ denial of a permit for development of a single
parcel was that parcel alone and not that single parcel, an adjacent plat,
and scattered wetlands also owned by the plaintiff.160 The fact that the
Court did not hear this case together with Murr or vacate the decision and
remand for consideration in light of Murr may mean that Murr does not
have the weight that some assume it has.161
Even if the Court believes, in spite of the Court of Appeals case, that
it settled the question of horizontal severance, the Murr factors certainly
do not settle all questions of conceptual severance—the breaking apart of
distinguishable property rights into multiple denominators. The issue of
conceptual severance of mineral rights from surface rights, sometimes
dubbed vertical severance, begs the question posed by scholar Frank
Michelman: Why not recognize the distinction between mineral and
surface rights and say “that the relevant denominator in testing a regulation
which impinges only on mining rights or foundry rights is the value of
those rights—which the regulation totally destroys?”162 While there are
certainly flaws with this method of determining denominators in situations
where the owner of the mineral rights is also owner of the surface rights,
because this would be the sort of strategic division of denominators the
Court cautioned against in Penn Central,163 it seems appropriate to frame
denominators this way for situations involving severed mineral rights.
C. The Possibility of a Lucas Total Taking
A footnote164 in the Court’s opinion in Lucas—which, as previously
discussed, stood for the principle that the government owed compensation
when it deprived property of all economically viable uses165—sheds some
light on the question of how to determine denominators in regulatory takings
cases. The Court states that the answer to the question of how to define the
denominator “may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State’s law of property,” in other words, to what degree state
property law has afforded protection for individual interests in the
property.166 As previously discussed, whether in a rights-based system like

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Lost Tree Village Corp., 787 F.3d at 1114.
Thomas, supra note 138.
Michelman, supra note 5, at 1193.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1016 n.7.
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Louisiana or an ownership-based system like Texas, state property law has
afforded mineral rights a great deal of protection.167
Scholars like Patrick C. McGinley168 argue that the Lucas categorical
takings rule should be limited to claims of owners of both mineral and
surface rights, thus precluding such a claim where the denominator is only
mineral rights.169 McGinley argues that the holding of Lucas does not
require the application of the categorical rule to future cases involving less
than full ownership and leaves unresolved the potential application of the
categorical rule to separately held mineral rights.170 While the Supreme
Court expressed hesitation in whole-heartedly endorsing this footnote in
Murr, it nonetheless explained how the Murr decision was consistent with
the deference to state law expressed in Lucas. This discussion indicates
that the footnote is at least worth considering.171
Also, Keystone is not conclusive on the denominator issue, which is
critical in determining whether to apply the Penn Central or the Lucas
standard.172 If courts expressly prohibited applying conceptual severance
to separately held mineral rights, which they do not, there would be no
possibility of a Lucas total taking, which would put the plaintiff in the
somewhat trickier position of having to prove a taking using the murky,
value-based analysis set forth in Penn Central. Even if courts do not
require the application of the Lucas categorical rule, they should apply it
because of the Court’s consistently expressed deference, even in its weaker
state in Murr, to state law protection of distinct property rights.
Under Louisiana’s rights-based or Texas’ ownership-based theory of
mineral rights, there is a possibility of a Lucas total taking so long as the
state does not expressly prohibit separate ownership of mineral rights.
Owners of mineral rights in jurisdictions like Texas have a more
167. See supra Part II. Pooling and unitization also protect mineral rights,
sometimes even in the wake of regulation. See generally 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER &
PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION, §§ 6.01, 6.02
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2017).
168. Patrick C. McGinley is a Charles H. Haden II Professor of Law at West
Virginia University’s College of Law and his written extensively relating to
environmental law, natural resources, and specifically coal law and regulation.
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW, FACULTY, PATRICK C.
MCGINLEY, https://perma.cc/2ABW-C9LU (last visited September 18, 2017).
169. Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations:
Applying the Lucas Categorical Takings Rule to Severed Mineral Property
Interests, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 525, 529 (2010).
170. Id. at 542.
171. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–47.
172. Riley, supra note 58, at 394.

2019]

COMMENT

579

straightforward claim under this theory, because they will be asserting a
taking of physical property, the minerals they own in place. Owners of
mineral rights in jurisdictions like Louisiana can reach the same result by
using the footnote in Lucas to demonstrate the Court’s potential acceptance
of a taking of a property interest like an exclusive right to produce minerals.
While owners of mineral rights in ownership-in-place jurisdictions like
Texas will have an easier time demonstrating a Lucas total taking of their
mineral rights, such a claim may also be successful in a rights-based
jurisdiction like Louisiana.
D. Still protected by Penn Central?
Even relying exclusively on Penn Central, courts should still protect
owners of separately held mineral rights by recognizing these rights as a
denominator apart from the surface rights. The Murr majority did not offer
any reason for precluding independent protection of divided interests
when state law encourages such division.173 The case for protection of such
interests is even stronger when the owner of the mineral rights does not
also have the rights to all possible surface uses. One scholar argued that
the regulatory taking inquiry should hinge on “whether the property
interest proposed to have been taken is in fact substantial enough to
warrant Fifth Amendment protection as an independent bundle of
rights.”174 As previously discussed,175 states have afforded mineral rights
a great deal of protection; and this approach would justify mineral rights
comprising distinct denominators.176
In the realm of Penn Central, the denominator analysis is especially
critical to determine whether a taking has occurred. The current analysis
precludes an owner from claiming a taking where a regulation leaves some
valuable uses of her property intact.177 Therefore, if the denominator
includes surface uses even in situations involving separately held mineral
rights, owners will almost always lose their takings claims because these
surface uses will offset whatever loss in value things like moratoriums on
drilling create. Some have suggested that, under Penn Central and
173. Epstein, supra note 29, at 885.
174. Fee, supra note 3, at 1557.
175. See supra Part III.
176. Texas, in particular, clearly treats mineral rights as an independent bundle
of rights. Texas jurisprudence holds that a mineral estate consists of five separate
and distinct interests: the right to develop, the right to lease, the right to receive
bonus payments, the right to receive delay rentals, and the right to receive royalty
payments. In re Estate of Slaughter, 305 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
177. Epstein, supra note 29, at 866.
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Keystone, courts should consider air, mineral, and surface rights as a single
denominator regardless of severed ownership;178 but this would lead to
some pretty absurd results, as the district court case in Kansas179 featured
in the Introduction indicates.
E. Penn Central Factors Analyzed for Severed Mineral Rights
A common-sense application of the Penn Central factors to separately
held mineral rights as their own denominator can still lead to compensable
takings. As previously mentioned,180 legal scholar Steven Eagle believes
that the “parcel as a whole,” which has become shorthand for the
denominator, is a fourth factor in these cases.181 An analysis of the Court’s
three factors and Eagle’s fourth factor demonstrates the possibility of
compensability in cases involving separately held mineral rights.
The first factor the Penn Central Court considers is the economic
impact of the regulation, which, perhaps more than any of the majority’s
other factors, is extremely fact-dependent.182 Here, if the government has
regulated away all or nearly all the economically valuable uses, there is
the added possibility of a Lucas total taking, as previously discussed.183 If,
in the alternative, the government’s regulation merely impacts part of the
value of the property, for instance if a drilling moratorium only affects part
of the property and drilling is still possible elsewhere on the property,
courts must weigh the rest of the factors to determine whether the
governmental action is still a compensable taking.
The second factor the Penn Central Court analyzes is the investmentbacked expectations of the owner.184 In weighing this factor, the Court’s
other cases provide some guidance. As previously mentioned,185 Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island stood for the proposition that reasonable land use
regulations do not effect a taking but also made clear that states could not
reduce property-owners’ rights just by regulating potential uses of land out
of individuals’ titles over time.186 In weighing this factor, courts should
certainly be cognizant of the fact that people who own severed mineral
rights, or any mineral rights for that matter, should expect to be regulated
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Fee, supra note 3, at 1558.
Mid Gulf, 792 F. Supp. at 1214.
See supra Part III.
See generally, Eagle, supra note 30, at 622-23.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
See supra Part V(C).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
See supra Part V(A).
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627 (2001).
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pretty heavily. However, courts should also be careful not to presume that
such owners expected to lose all or nearly all of their rights.
The third factor the Penn Central Court considers is the character of
government action.187 This factor is where the public nuisance exception,
mentioned above relating to Keystone,188 comes in. The State is certainly
free to prevent something as severe as subsidence, as in Keystone, but
should not be free to pass protectionist legislation targeting private
interests but declaring itself as connected to putative public interests, as in
Pennsylvania Coal. Courts may have problems in drawing this distinction.
In so doing, they should be especially careful not to apply cases like
Keystone and Penn Central as bright-line rules militating against vertical
or conceptual severance of property interests rather than the fact-sensitive,
complex inquiries they are in reality.
Another concept the Penn Central Court discusses, treated here as a
fourth factor, is the “parcel as a whole.”189 This concept essentially
incorporates the denominator analysis into the analysis to determine the
compensability of the action challenged as a taking. In regulatory takings
cases involving separately held mineral rights, the “parcel as a whole” in
an ownership-based jurisdiction like Texas or a rights-based jurisdiction
like Louisiana should be only the severed mineral rights, not merely
because this would be the only regulated property but also because this
property is fundamentally distinct from the surface rights. Under either
theory, viewing the severed mineral rights as the “parcel as a whole,” or
denominator, is not dividing the parcel up to increase takings liability but
is rather looking only to the parcel at issue without considering other
parcels or property interests. Thus, an application of the Penn Central
factors can lead to a finding of compensability for a taking of separately
held mineral rights.
CONCLUSION:A TIME AND PLACE FOR CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
Situations involving separately held mineral rights seem ripe for the
theory of conceptual severance, since owners of such rights cannot use the
surface of a property in all the ways surface owners can. Scholars have
criticized the use of conceptual severance in situations where the property
owner holds both the mineral and surface rights. Application of conceptual
severance would allow such an owner to be compensated for something
like a prohibition on drilling a gas well in spite of the fact that she would
187. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
188. See supra Part III(C).
189. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
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still be able to put the surface to all manners of alternative uses.190
Conceptual severance is clearly inappropriate in this situation, because it
would use only those rights affected by the regulation as the denominator.
While the Court has generally rejected defining the denominator as
only the rights or the part of the parcel affected by the regulation in
question, it has nevertheless employed the theory of conceptual severance
under certain circumstances to construe the denominator more narrowly
and thus find a taking where there might not otherwise be one.191 Situations
like ownership of separately held mineral rights, in which the owner does
not also have access to alternative surface uses, cry out for this sort of
analysis as a logical approach to prevent unduly harsh results.192 Without
conceptual severance in these situations, plaintiffs who own only the
mineral rights would be without compensation merely by virtue of the
existence of alternative surface uses that they could not exercise.
While the Court has tried to curb the use of the conceptual severance
doctrine, it has nonetheless been receptive to its application when value is
tied to a single use which regulation prohibits, so long as no economic
value remains through other uses.193 The very nature of separately held
mineral rights implies that value is tied to a single use; so the Court should
have no problem with conceptual severance in these situations. While
Murr appears to be another instance in which the Court is disavowing or
at least strongly disfavoring notions of conceptual severance for takings
analyses, owners of separately held mineral rights still have valid takings
claims where regulations place a moratorium on drilling but would still
allow for other development. Their mineral rights would only allow them
to use the surface to the extent necessary for their drilling and would also
not give them rights to develop on the surface.
Asking a court to consider mineral rights as a separate denominator
when the owner of the mineral rights also owns surface rights on the
property is certainly the sort of division the Court was cautioning against.
However, asking a court to do the same when all the owner has is the
190. Riley, supra note 58, at 391.
191. Allee, supra note 23, at 1973–79.
192. Of course, if the only regulation is on drilling or other access in a
particular place, the situation becomes even more complicated, as these situations
may result in partial takings, affecting a stick in the bundle of rights that comprise
mineral rights ownership. These situations can still give rise to compensable
takings, though, because the most important attribute of mineral rights ownership
is the right of surface access. Karolyn King Nelson, Takings Law West of the
Pecos: Inverse Condemnation of Federal Oil and Gas Rights, 37 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 253, 273 (1997).
193. Wright, supra note 107, at 209.
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mineral rights associated with a property does not pose the same risk.
Rather, this sort of conceptual severance makes sense and is in keeping
with the Armstrong fairness principle, that the Government should not
force “some people alone to bear public burdens which, in fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”194 at the heart of the
regulatory takings doctrine. It would not be fair to force owners of
separately held mineral rights to lose a higher proportion of the value of
their property than other owners of mineral rights without any means by
which they could recoup their losses.
The original animus behind the creation of the regulatory takings
doctrine also militates in favor of treating separately held mineral rights as
a separate denominator.195 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes
invalidated a prohibition on extracting sub-surface coal that supported
surface-level buildings owned by someone other than the owner of the coal
on the grounds that he did not “see that the fact that [such surface owners’]
risk has become a danger warrants giving to them greater rights than they
bought.”196 Viewing separately held mineral rights and surface rights
together as one denominator would give surface owners greater rights than
they bought and effectively strip owners of mineral rights of their rights.
While the Murr factors and other recent cases signal that the Court is
hesitant to buy into the theory of conceptual severance, the factors favor a
different result in cases involving separately held mineral rights. As
demonstrated by the preceding analysis, such mineral rights should be
viewed as a denominator apart from the rest of the tract with which they
are associated, because holders of these rights do not have the potential for
alternative uses that owners of surface rights, with or without mineral
rights, have at their disposal.
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